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NOGA MORAG-LEVINE* 
The History of Precautiont 
DAVID VoGEL, THE PoLITICS oF PRECAUTION: REGULATING HEALTH, 
SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN EuROPE AND THE UNITED 
STATES (2012). 
THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: CoMPARING RisK REGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., 2011) 
The distinctiveness of European from American regulatory cul-
tures or traditions is a matter of longstanding controversy. Two recent 
books-The Politics of Precaution by David Vogel- and The Reality 
of Precaution, edited by Jonathan Wiener with several others-have 
made notable contributions to this debate. Both books argue that regu-
latory cultures or traditions are incapable of explaining current 
differences between American and European approaches to precau-
tion, which they define as regulatory stringency. For Wiener, this 
conclusion derives from the inconsistency of patterns of stringency be-
tween the United States and Europe. Vogel argues that while the 
stringency of current European environmental regulation indeed ex-
ceeds that of its U.S. counterpart, the split is unstable and opened 
relatively recently. In combination, the books aspire to put to rest an 
entire family of historical-institutional explanations for cross-national 
regulatory differences in the transatlantic context and beyond. 
This essay draws from legal history to argue for an alternative 
position: legal traditions and their associated administrative-law 
principles are highly relevant to current transatlantic conflicts over 
precaution. The paper's starting point is the distinction between two 
separate meanings of the precautionary principle, the first prescrip-
tive, and the second permissive. In its prescriptive sense the 
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precautionary principle urges regulators to take stringent mitigation 
measures in the face of scientifically uncertain risks. In its permissive 
sense, the principle authorizes the state to regulate when the relevant 
harms are scientifically uncertain. Conflicts over permissive precau-
tion thus inherently reflect divergent views of the scope of the state's 
autonomy in the regulation of risk. These disparate views correspond 
closely, in turn, with relevant differences between the administrative-
law traditions respectively associated with Anglo-American common 
law and Continental civil law. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States and the European Union (EU) clashed openly 
at the start of the twenty-first century over the proper regulatory re-
sponse to a number of environmental health and safety risks, 
including greenhouse gases, chemicals, hormones in beef, and genetic 
modification of food crops. 1 With respect to all of these areas, the 
United States cited scientific uncertainty as grounds for delaying or 
limiting regulatory restrictions. By contrast, the EU, invoking the 
precautionary principle, argued that it possessed authority to regu-
late in advance of clear scientific proof of harm. In a speech before 
European regulators in 2003-a time of particularly heightened ten-
sions over this question-John D. Graham, the then-head of the U.S. 
Office of Information and Regulatory Mfairs (OIRA), said of the pre-
cautionary principle: ''We consider it to be a mythical concept, 
perhaps like a unicorn."2 The tone was emblematic of the transatlan-
tic schism that had opened. 
Identifiable differences between European and American ap-
proaches to the regulation of technological risk became evident 
almost in tandem with the creation of new environmental regimes in 
the United States and Western Europe in the 1970s. The resulting 
puzzle has since produced an extensive and important body of schol-
arship collectively focused on the source of transnational differences 
in regulatory policy and style.3 While building on these initial stud-
1. Norman J. Vig & Micheal G. Faure, Introduction, in GREEN GIANTs? ENVIRON· 
MENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 2 (Norman J. Vig 
& Michael G. Faure eds., 2004) [hereinafter GREEN GIANTs?); Samuel Loewenberg, 
Precaution Is for Europeans, N.Y. TrMES, May 18, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2003/05/18/weekinreview/precaution-is-for-europeans.html. 
2. Loewenberg, supra note 1. 
3. See, e.g., SusAN RosE-AcKERMAN, CoNTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL PoLicY: THE 
LIMITS oF PuBLic LAw IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (1995); JosEPH L. BADA· 
RACCO, JR., LOADING THE DICE: A FIVE-COUNTRY STUDY OF VINYL CHLORIDE 
REGULATION (1985); RoNALD BRICKMAN, SHEILA JASANOFF & THoMAS lLGEN, CoNTROL· 
LING CHEMICALS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
(1985); RoBERT A. KAGAN, AnVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAw (2001); 
STEVEN KELMAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING SWEDEN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
oF OccUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PoLICY (1981); LENNART J. LUNDQVIST, THE 
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ies, more recent comparisons of American and European 
environmental regulatory policy can be distinguished in a number of 
ways. Rather than individual European countries, it is the EU as a 
whole that is nowadays the primary unit of comparison to the United 
States (though case studies of individual European countries still 
play a role). Likely related is the degree to which recent comparative 
works have taken the European-championed terminology of "precau-
tion" as their starting point, irrespective of the various authors' 
definition of, or sympathy towards, the precautionary principle. The 
result has been a bumper crop of recent studies focused on whether, 
how, and why Europe has become more precautionary than the 
United States.4 Of particular note are two recent books: The Politics 
of Precaution, by David Vogel,5 and The Reality of Precaution, co-ed-
ited by Jonathan B. Wiener, Michael Rogers, James Hammitt, and 
Peter Sand (referred to hereinafter as Wiener).6 
Written by leading scholars in comparative environmental law, 
both books deepen and enrich understandings of the complexity of 
risk regulation on both sides of the Atlantic at the start of the twenty-
first century. As can perhaps be deduced from the parallel titles, the 
two books are engaged in dialogue with each other. While in agree-
ment over many aspects of contemporary American and European 
risk regulation, the conclusions they draw diverge in one key respect. 
The Reality of Precaution argues that conventional understandings of 
Europe as more precautionary than the United States do not with-
stand empirical scrutiny. Instead, the evidence suggests that "the 
reality of precaution is a much more complex pattern of overall par-
HARE AND THE TORTOISE: CLEAN AIR POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN 
(1980); REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN Ao-
VERSARIAL LEGALISM (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 2000); EcKARD REHBINDER 
& RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY (1985); DAVID VOGEL, NA-
TIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL PoLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE 
UNITED STATES (1986). 
4. See e.g., GREEN GIANTS?, supra note 1; DouGLAS A. KYsAR, REGULATING FRoM 
NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010); MARK A. 
POLLACK AND GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAw AND PoLITics oF GENETICALLY MoDIFIED FooDs (2009); LINAM. SVEDIN, ADAM 
LUEDTKE & THAD E. HALL, RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN 
UNION: CoNTROLLING CHAos (2009); UNCERTAIN RrsKS REGULATED (Michelle Everson 
& Ellen Vos eds., 2009); KERRY H. WHITESIDE, PRECAUTIONARY PoLITics: PRINCIPLE 
AND PRAcTICE IN CoNFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RrsK (2006); Robert V. Percival, 
Who's Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 21 (2006). 
5. DAVID VoGEL, THE PoLITics OF PRECAUTION: REGULATING HEALTH, SAFETY, 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL RrsKS rN EuROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2012). 
6. THE REALITY oF PRECAUTION: CoMPARING RrsK REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPE (Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter THE REALITY 
oF PRECAUTION]. In addition to serving as the lead editor, Jonathan Wiener co-au-
thored two of the case studies in the book and the quantitative comparison study, and 
wrote the introductory and concluding chapters. 
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ity,"7 and that while Europeans are more precautionary about some 
risks, Americans show greater precaution about others. The view pro-
moted by The Politics of Precaution, by contrast, is that Europe today 
is indeed more precautionary than the United States with respect to 
key environmental and public health risks. Importantly, Vogel un-
derstands greater European precaution to be a relatively recent 
phenomenon and a reversal of the situation during the 1970s and 
early 1980s when Europe lagged behind the United States, a shift he 
attributes largely to changes in the domestic politics of the respective 
regions. Hence the rationale for the dueling titles becomes clear: the 
Politics as opposed to the Reality of precaution. In earlier publica-
tions Vogel dubbed the thesis regarding the precautionary switch 
between Europe and the United States the "flip flop" hypothesis.8 The 
Reality of Precaution was partially conceived as an empirical test of 
that hypothesis, as Wiener notes in the introduction to the book, and 
one of the study's primary findings is its rejection.9 
This disagreement aside, the two books concur with respect to 
one central point. They both reject cultural or historical-institutional 
explanations for transatlantic variations in levels of precaution. For 
Wiener, this conclusion derives from the absence of consistent pat-
terns of stringency on either side of the Atlantic. For Vogel, it is a 
function of the instability and ostensible recent emergence of the cur-
rent transatlantic split. The premise that "a variable cannot be 
explained by a constant,"10 leads Vogel to reject "historically rooted" 
and national-cultural explanations11 in favor of a set of interrelated 
factors based on public opinion, leadership preferences, and guiding 
policy criteria.l2 Together, it might seem these books have settled a 
matter of long-standing debate: the capacity of legal culture and in-
7. Jonathan B. Wiener, Introduction: The Rhetoric of Precaution, in THE REALITY 
OF PRECAUTION, supra note 6, at 3, 13. 
8. Regarding the "flip-flop" terminology, Vogel's recent book clarifies that a lit-
eral switch between the United States and Europe exists only with respect to the list 
of risks against which the United States took earlier and more stringent action in the 
1970s and 1980s, e.g., toxic chemicals and ozone depleting substances. Many of the 
risks regarding which the EU currently shows greater precaution, e.g., climate 
change and genetically modified (GM) foods, were not subject to stringent regulation 
on either side of the Atlantic earlier on. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 5-6. 
9. As Wiener writes in the book's introductory chapter, "The merit of the flip-flop 
or reversal claim is a central question of this book." Wiener, supra note 7, at 12. "In 
sum, both our case studies and our quantitative study find little or no support for the 
hypotheses of U.S.-European convergence, divergence, or reversal (flip-flop) in rela-
tive precaution over the past four decades." Jonathan B. Wiener, The Real Pattern of 
Precaution, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION, supra note 6, at 519, 533. 
10. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 30. 
11. Id. at 34. 
12. Id. at 293-94. 
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stitutions to explain cross-national regulatory differences in the 
transatlantic context and beyond.13 
This essay draws from legal history to argue for an alternative 
position: legal traditions and their associated administrative-law 
principles are highly relevant to current transatlantic conflicts over 
precaution. The starting point is the distinction between two sepa-
rate meanings of the precautionary principle-the first prescriptive, 
and the second permissive.14 Used prescriptively, the precautionary 
principle urges regulators to take stringent mitigation measures in 
response to scientifically uncertain risks. Used permissively, the 
principle authorizes the state to regulate even in the face of scientific 
uncertainty. Prescriptive precaution is thus concerned with regula-
tory outcomes, whereas permissive precaution speaks to relevant 
legal principles. Largely ignoring this distinction, both Vogel and 
Wiener base their analysis and conclusions on a prescriptive inter-
pretation of the precautionary principle. To be more precautionary, in 
both books' formulation, is to act earlier and more decisively in re-
sponse to uncertain risk. It is, however, the permissive meaning that 
has figured most prominently in recent transatlantic tensions, as 
these have for the most part focused on the scope of regulatory discre-
tion, rather than any obligation to regulate. Moreover, it is the 
permissive meaning that is essential for the purpose of assessing the 
relevance of historical legal and political institutions to European-
American divisions over precaution. 
Understood as a permissive rather than prescriptive rule, the 
principle can be restated as a requirement of judicial deference to-
wards regulatory measures even where the evidence linking the 
regulated activities with distinct harms is uncertain. Seen through 
this prism, disagreements over permissive precaution track long-
standing divisions between common law and civil law-based under-
standings of administrative autonomy and judicial review. Debate 
over health and safety regulation in both Britain and the United 
States during the nineteenth century revolved. around competing 
models of administration-the first termed "nuisance," the second 
"police." Nuisance, reflecting common law principles of judicial 
supremacy, gave courts a final say on the reasonableness of regula-
tory interventions in the face of uncertainty regarding relevant 
environmental and public health risks. Police, by contrast, granted 
administrative bodies autonomous discretion regarding regulatory 
decisions of this type, in accordance with Continental understandings 
13. See MARY DouGLAS & AARoN WILDAVSKY, RisK AND CuLTURE: AN EssAY ON 
THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); SHEILA JASA-
NOFF, RISK MANAGEMENT AND PoLITICAL CuLTURE: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY OF SciENCE 
IN THE PoLICY CoNTExT (1986). 
14. For specific references to this dual meaning of precaution within the litera-
ture on the topic see infra Part II. 
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of state prerogative. Within the context of this nineteenth-century 
conflict, the relevance of legal traditions was self-evident. The argu-
ment that the police model violated core precepts of common law 
constitutionalism was time and again deployed by both British and 
American opponents of Continental-style regulatory measures.15 
Supporters of such reforms, meanwhile, rejected the alleged constitu-
tional status of common law institutions and argued for the 
legitimacy of the Continental approach. That differences in legal tra-
ditions were front and center in this fight was, however, not in doubt. 
American regulatory discourse today is rarely explicit with re-
spect to the difference between common law and civil law ideas 
regarding administrative autonomy and judicial supremacy. But 
while we no longer construe the pertinent choice in terms of compet-
ing nuisance and police paradigms, common law sensibilities retain 
their influence on American administrative law practices and 
thought. The administrative autonomy inherent in permissive pre-
caution conflicts with the common law's long-standing insistence that 
judges, rather than state administrators, have the final say on which 
health and safety risks justify regulatory interventions. 16 The Euro-
pean Court's deferential stance towards administrative risk 
assessment and the European institutions' demand for similar defer-
ence from the World Trade Organization (WT0)17 are likewise 
consistent with the long-standing practices of domestic courts in Ger-
many and other environmental leaders within the EU.18 
The insight that current disputes are the contemporary incarna-
tions of this historical division is not intended as a normative 
argument on the superiority of either the Continental or Anglo-Amer-
ican approach. Neither does it suggest that Americans are somehow 
united in monolithic support for the judicialized administrative mod-
els associated with the common law, nor that Continental-modeled-
institutions have failed at times to find substantial foothold in Ameri-
can regulatory practices and vice versa. The claim instead is both 
descriptive and relatively narrow in scope: common-law-based rheto-
ric and ideology did not disappear from American regulatory 
discourse and policy with the New Deal. The contemporary American 
preference for judicial oversight over the regulation of scientifically 
15. See Noga Morag-Levine, Common Law, Civil Law, and the Administrative 
State: From Coke to Lochner, 24 CoNST. CoMMENT. 601, 628-37 (2007) [hereinafter 
Morag-Levine, Common Law, Civil Law]; Noga Morag-Levine, Is Precautionary Regu-
lation a Civil Law Instrument? Lessons from the History of the Alkali Act, 23 J. ENVTL. 
L. 1, 13-27 (2011) [hereinafter Morag-Levine, Alkali Act]. Noga Morag-Levine, Facts, 
Formalism, and the Brandeis Brief: The Origins of a Myth. 2013 U. ILL. L. REv. 59, 
71-77 (2013) [hereinafter Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism]. 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. See RosE-ACKERMAN, supra note 3; BRICKMAN, JASANOFF & ILGEN, supra note 
3. 
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uncertain health risks, both in the domestic and international are-
nas, is consistent and continuous with the long-standing role of 
judges in the adjudication of nuisance disputes under common law. 
We cannot make sense of current transatlantic regulatory relations 
in isolation from this history. 
The Reality of Precaution and The Politics of Precaution, individ-
ually and in combination, are important achievements advancing and 
enriching the transatlantic comparison of regulatory approaches. 
They are essential reading for anyone with an interest in the intrica-
cies and complexities of American and European risk regulation. 
When it comes to their treatment of the role of legal culture, tradi-
tions, and institutions, however, both books rush to conclusions that 
a longer historical perspective would fail to support. The remainder 
of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I provides a snapshot compari-
son of the two books' methodologies and chief findings. Part II 
expands on the distinction between prescriptive and permissive pre-
caution and its relationship to divergent models of administrative 
law. Part III ties current divisions over permissive precaution to the 
historical distinction between the Continental police and common 
law nuisance paradigms, and follows the latter's incarnation in 
American "hard-look" judicial review. Part IV takes up the challenge 
of reconciling the view that differences in legal traditions are behind 
the transatlantic divisions over precaution, with the existence of evi-
dent variations between common law jurisdictions, most importantly 
the United Kingdom and the United States, with respect to the ques-
tions at issue. The implications of this history for Vogel's and 
Wiener's analyses ofthe role of judicial review, legal culture, and tra-
ditions are the subject of Part V. 
I. THE REALITY AND POLITICS OF PRECAUTION 
A The Reality of Precaution 
The Reality of Precaution is the most ambitious and comprehen-
sive effort to date to empirically compare European and American 
responses to risk. A joint venture of a group of leading American and 
European scholars, the book employs two separate tools. The first is a 
series of detailed case studies of European and American responses to 
a broad spectrum of risks. The second is a quantitative analysis of the 
regulatory standards adopted (without regard to implementation) in 
response to a set of one hundred randomly selected risks drawn from 
a dataset of nearly three thousand.19 In combination, this dual strat-
19. See Brendan Swedlow, Denise Kall, Zheng Zhou, James K Hammitt & 
Jonathan B. Wiener, A Quantitative Comparison of Relative Precaution in the United 
States and Europe, 1970-2004, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION, supra note 6, at 377. 
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egy aims to provide both the depth and the breadth necessary to 
support an empirically valid transatlantic comparison. 
Importantly, the study was designed to identify governmental re-
sponses to risk as such, rather than the narrower regulation of 
environmental and health and safety risks. The universe of risks ex-
amined as a consequence is considerably broader than the familiar 
list of food safety and environmental risks that typically feature in 
transatlantic comparisons of this sort. This is most evident in the de-
sign of the quantitative study, whose 100 risks span eighteen 
separate categories, which, in addition to familiar examples of envi-
ronmental and occupational health and safety risks, include crime 
and violence; alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs; medication and medi-
cal treatment; recreation; war, security and terrorism; consumer 
products; and construction. The rationale for this breadth was the 
necessity of "a representative sample of risks that may be subject to 
regulation" if valid conclusions on relative precaution were to be 
drawn.20 In this, the authors of the quantitative study have sought to 
correct for what they perceive to be the primary deficiency in the ex-
isting body of literature comparing European and American 
precaution: case-selection bias. Whereas earlier studies tended to fo-
cus on specific policy areas (e.g., cancer) or categories of risk (e.g., 
environmental protection), the goal here was "to assemble a database 
representing the universe of risks and draw a representative sample 
from that list."21 
The objective of broadening the transatlantic comparison beyond 
the well-trodden territory of environmental risks and health and 
safety is evident also in the range of specific risks considered in the 
book's eleven case studies. Particularly notable in this respect is the 
inclusion of risks from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). As Jessica Stern and Jonathan Wiener explain at the start of 
their chapter on the topic, terrorism, using conventional methods or 
WMD, "has become one of the great risk problems of the current 
era."22 Working from this premise, the authors compare "the degree 
of precaution exhibited by counterterrorism policies in the United 
States and Europe from 1970 to 2005."23 In this connection they con-
trast the American (and British) willingness to go to war in response 
to the threat of WMD in Iraq with the refusal to join the second Gulf 
War by "key European countries [such as Germany and France], 
which generally favor precaution as applied to health and environ-
mental risks."24 The conclusion drawn is that when it comes to 
20. Id. at 379. 
21. Id. at 404. 
22. Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass De-
struction, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION, supra note 6, at 285, 285. 
23. Id. at 286. 
24. Id. at 285-86. 
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terrorism and WMD, the conventional wisdom regarding greater Eu-
ropean precaution is seemingly turned on its head. More broadly, 
"[t]he pattern indicates that neither the United States nor Europe 
can claim to be precautionary or antiprecautionary across the board; 
rather, the reality is of precautionary particularity ... [i.e.,] selective 
use of precaution against selected risks at different times, on both 
sides of the Atlantic."25 
Relative precaution is judged in reference to the timing and 
stringency of actions taken in the United States and Europe with re-
spect to each of the risks examined. 26 Employing these criteria both 
in its case studies and quantitative assessment, The Reality of Pre-
caution ultimately rejects the claimed existence of any consistent 
patterns distinguishing American and European responses to risk. 
Certain risks received earlier and more stringent responses in Eu-
rope; in other cases, the United States was more proactive. 
Notwithstanding areas of visible transatlantic divergence, the overall 
pattern suggests "substantial internal variation in the degree of pre-
caution in risk regulation across risks, agencies, and Member States, 
both within the United States and within Europe."27 Contrary to the 
vision of two coherent and distinct American and European ap-
proaches to risk, "the reality of precaution is a much more complex 
pattern of overall parity, combined with detailed variation on partic-
ular risks."28 
The implications that Wiener draws from this conclusion are far 
reaching, most importantly, as already mentioned above, with regard 
to the validity of any explanations of cross-national regulatory differ-
ences based in culture or legal tradition. As he writes, if "attitudes 
towards risks, technology, and regulation are not uniform or perma-
nent on either side of the Atlantic," then claims regarding the 
existence and source of such differences are mere "stereotypes, not 
empirical reality."29 Put differently, if there are no consistent trans-
atlantic differences in the level of precaution in the first place, the 
collapse of explanations of what might account for such differences-
whether political, legal-institutional, or drawn from any other 
realm-follows as a matter of logic. 
B. The Politics of Precaution 
The eye-catching cover of David Vogel's The Politics of Precau-
tion sports a pair of cows, American and European flags respectively 
25. Id. at 286. 
26. Wiener, supra note 9, at 530 ("Thus, we treat precaution as a strategy, and 
measure its degree as a continuous variable in terms of two factors: timing and 
stringency."). 
27. Id. at 521. 
28. Wiener, supra note 7, at 13. 
29. Id. at 8. 
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attached to their ears, pointing in opposite directions from one an-
other. Evoking European-American disputes over hormones in beef 
as a proxy for broader transatlantic divisions, this picture whimsi-
cally telegraphs the book's central thesis regarding current 
regulatory differences between Europe and the United States. Vogel 
builds his assessment through detailed analysis of current American 
and European regulatory policies regarding chemicals, greenhouse 
gases, genetically modified (GM) foods, beef hormones, antibiotics in 
animal feed, hazardous material in electronic waste, and chemicals in 
children's toys and cosmetics. The time span covered in the case stud-
ies starts in the early 1970s so as to allow for comparison of European 
and American responses to environmental risk across both space and 
time. The conclusion consequently drawn identifies a distinct shift in 
the relative precaution of American and European policies regarding 
environmental and health and safety risks. Whereas during the 
1970s and 1980s the United States was the more precautionary of the 
two jurisdictions, since the early 1990s the EU has assumed global 
leadership in this regard. 
Similarly to Wiener, Vogel equates relative precaution with risk 
aversion, as reflected in the timing and stringency of regulation. 
However, the book's underlying methodology otherwise differs in 
some important respects. The first is the universe of risks examined. 
Whereas Wiener and his colleagues chose risk writ large as the object 
of their analysis, Vogel limited his study to the regulation of "health, 
safety, and environmental risks caused by business."30 Excluded as a 
consequence are some of the key examples Wiener offers as instances 
of greater American precaution: nuclear energy, speed limits, teenage 
drinking, public smoking, and, most notably, terrorism and WMD. 
Vogel cites the particular "political dynamics" associated with the 
regulation of business-generated environmental and public safety 
risks in his explanation of the decision to exclude other categories of 
risk from his study.31 Given this narrower focus, Vogel considers his 
findings regarding the existence of transatlantic divergence to be po-
tentially compatible with Wiener's finding of no consistent 
differences. AB he explains, his "argument is not that the EU has be-
come more risk-averse than the United States, but rather that it has 
become more risk-averse toward a broad range of health, safety, and 
environmental risks."32 Anticipating this argument, Wiener explic-
itly rejects Vogel's distinction in this regard, and argues that "[e]ven 
within the category of environmental risks ... the reality does not 
support the claim that U.S. policy has substantially slowed and the 
30. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 18. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 19-20. 
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two sides have 'traded places."'33 In support, he offers a long list of 
environmental statutes and regulations put in place over the past 
three decades relating to the regulation of toxic waste, air pollution, 
and drinking water, among others.34 Vogel seemingly counters with 
the statement that 
[w]hile not every European and American consumer or envi-
ronmental risk regulation is consistent with a transatlantic 
shift in regulatory stringency since 1990, a disproportionate 
number of the consumer and environmental regulations 
adopted, or not adopted, on either side of the Atlantic during 
the last five decades do fit this pattern.35 
An additional element distinguishing Vogel's methodology from 
Wiener's is his focus on change over time in the regulatory policies on 
both sides of the Atlantic. In keeping with this focus, each of the case 
study chapters pairs current examples of greater European precau-
tion with earlier instances of increased American precaution 
regarding the same family of risks. Thus, in his discussion of food 
safety, Vogel juxtaposes the more stringent current European restric-
tions on GM foods and beef hormones with the earlier American 
stringency reflected in the 1958 Delaney Clause ban on cancer-caus-
ing food additives, and subsequent restrictions on the use of the 
steroid growth promoter DES in cattle, the artificial sweetener cycla-
mate, the pesticides Aldrin and Dieldrin, and the treatment of apples 
with Alar.36 As to air pollution, Vogel contrasts the current European 
leadership on climate change with the earlier and more stringent ac-
tion of the United States regarding automotive emissions and ozone-
depleting chemicals.37 Finally, Vogel finds in the evolution of chemi-
cal regulation in Europe and the United States an almost 
paradigmatic illustration of the "flip-flop" between earlier American 
precaution under the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act and the 
greater precaution now characteristic of European regulation of 
chemicals under the REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisa-
tion and Restriction of Chemicals). as 
In response to these findings, Vogel offers what he terms a "Big 
Picture" explanatory framework"39 that links three critical transfor-
mations in the American and European political context. The first is 
33. Wiener, supra note 6 at 527. 
34. Wiener, supra note 9, at 527. 
35. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 5. 
36. Id. at 48, 54, 66. 
37. Id. at 152. 
38. Id. at 187-88; Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-469, 90 Stat. 2003 
(1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629); Regulation 1907/2006, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 Concerning the Regis-
tration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals, 2007 O.J. (L 136) 3. 
39. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 3. 
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the growing political salience of consumer and environmental risks in 
Europe, and attendant public pressure for regulatory intervention. 
The second is increased political polarization in the United States 
and an associated decline in the earlier bipartisan support for strin-
gent environmental regulation, which contrasts with a far less 
polarized political landscape in Europe, at least along this dimension. 
And the third is a growing gap between European willingness to reg-
ulate in the face of scientific uncertainty and increased American 
emphasis on scientific proof of risk and on formal risk assessment.40 
In tandem, Vogel rejects a number of alternative explanations for 
the transatlantic divergence, including differences in actual risks 
faced,41 a push to "catch up"42 following expansion in the EU's regu-
latory authority, differences in underlying economic interests,43 the 
role of political systems,44 and most importantly for the purpose of 
this discussion, cultural values and attitudes toward the role of gov-
ernment.45 Where the latter two are concerned, Vogel highlights the 
alleged shift in the respective American and European regulatory ori-
entations as decisive grounds for the rejection of explanations based 
in culture or attitudes towards government. As he writes, "Europe's 
statist traditions and America's long-standing hostility to 'big govern-
ment' and belief in 'free enterprise' cannot explain why, for three 
decades, the United States consistently enacted more extensive and 
costly consumer and environmental regulations than did most Euro-
pean countries as well as the EU."46The United States' shift from 
environmental leader to laggard over the course of the past four de-
cades decisively refutes, in Vogel's account, explanations rooted in 
historical institutions and embedded cultural predispositions, on the 
assumption that any such explanations are inconsistent with the per-
ceived discontinuities in American policy.47 
II. PERMISSIVE VERSUS PRESCRIPTIVE PRECAUTION 
The Reality of Precaution and The Politics of Precaution share a 
common understanding of the relevant meaning of precaution in the 
context of the transatlantic comparison. To be more precautionary, in 
both books' formulation, is to act earlier and more decisively in re-
sponse to uncertain risk. By equating precaution with risk aversion, 
both Vogel and Wiener restrict their analysis to only half, and argua-
bly the less central, of the meanings associated with the related 
40. Id. at 34-45. 
41. Id. at 23. 
42. Id. at 25. 
43. I d. at 27. 
44. Id. at 31. 
45. Id. at 32. 
46. Id. at 30-31. 
47. Id. at 34. 
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precautionary principle and discussions within the transatlantic 
context. 
Current writings on the precautionary principle include two dis-
tinct, if related, concepts under its umbrella-the first prescriptive, 
the second permissive. In its prescriptive meaning, the principle re-
quires stringent, risk averse regulation even if the relevant risks 
remain uncertain. In its permissive sense, the principle speaks to the 
existence of regulatory authority, rather than any obligation to take 
regulatory action again uncertain risks. Put differently, the principle 
is said to act as both a sword and a shield.48 Used as a sword, the 
principle seeks more stringent and risk-averse actions in the face of 
uncertain risks-demands that may be directed at the relevant regu-
latory decision-makers, or the judicial bodies in charge of reviewing 
them. By contrast, when used as a shield, the principle serves to de-
fend and insulate regulatory discretion from judicial and other 
oversight mechanisms. Theofanis Christoforou, a principal legal ad-
viser with the European Commission, offers an unusually clear 
differentiation between the principle's two core meanings: 
The precautionary principle applies to scientific uncertainty 
and risk regulation. It permits regulatory authorities to take 
action or adopt measures in order to avoid, eliminate, or re-
duce risks to health, the environment, or in the workplace. 
The precautionary principle may also oblige the regulatory 
authorities to take action when this is necessary to avoid ex-
ceeding the acceptable level of risk. 49 
In their discussion of the definition of the precautionary principle 
as such, both Vogel50 and Wiener51 refer to permissive and prescrip-
48. For a discussion of the precautionary principle's dual "sword and shield" func-
tions, see Nicholas De Sadeleer, The Precautionary Principle in European Community 
Health and Environment Law: Sword or Shield for the Nordic Countries?, in IMPLE-
MENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: APPROACHES FROM THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, 
EU AND USA 10 (Nicholas De Sadeleer ed., 2007); MARIA LEE, EU ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAw: CHALLENGES, CHANGE AND DECISION-MAKING 104-05 (2005); Giandomenico 
Majone, Strategic Issues in Risk Regulation and Risk Management, in ORGANISATION 
FOR EcoNOMic Co-oPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RrsK AND REGULATORY PoLICY: IM-
PROVING THE GOVERNANCE OF RISK 108 (2010). Joseph Corkin distinguishes between 
the principle as expressed in "permissive terms" and in "emphatic terms" (the latter 
equated with "allowing the principle to be used as a sword"). Joseph Corkin, Science, 
Legitimacy and the Law: Regulating Risk Regulation Judiciously in the European 
Community, 33 EuR. L. REv. 359, 380--81 (2008). In similar fashion, Alberto 
Alemanno distinguishes between "obligatory" and "facultative" interpretations of the 
precautionary principle. ALBERTO ALEMANNO, TRADE IN FooD: REGULATORY AND JuDI-
CIAL APPROACHES IN THE EC AND THE WTO 125-28 (2007). 
49. Theofanis Christoforou, The Precautionary Principle, Risk Assessments, and 
the Comparative Role of Science in the European Community and the US Legal Sys-
tems, in GREEN GIANTs?, supra note 1, at 17, 17 (emphasis added). 
50. Vogel writes in connection with this, "While there are scores of definitions of 
the precautionary principle, in essence, it enables, encourages, or requires policy 
makers to 'err on the side of caution."' VoGEL, supra note 5, at 275. 
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tive meanings of the principle (without using these terms). But, in 
using stringency and timing as their comparative criteria, both au-
thors exclude the principle's permissive meaning from their empirical 
analysis. Wiener is explicit in this respect when he follows a discus-
sion of the precautionary principle's alternative meanings with the 
following methodological explanation: 
Our approach in this book has been to convert these narra-
tive conceptions of the PP [precautionary principle] into a 
measure of the degree of relative precaution, stated as a con-
tinuous variable .... The earlier in time a policy is adopted, 
the greater the uncertainty about the future manifestation 
of the risk, and the more stringent the policy, the greater the 
prevention of future risk. These two dimensions translate 
the narrative versions above into a continuous measure of 
degree of relative precaution. 52 
Having defined the precautionary principle as a prescriptive 
mandate for early and stringent regulation, both authors interpret 
the internally inconsistent levels of compliance with this mandate, 
both in Europe and the United States, as grounds for rejecting an 
entire family of historical-institutional explanations for transatlantic 
differences. 
Yet for the purpose of understanding the root of recent transat-
lantic regulatory tensions, it is the precautionary principle's 
permissive meaning that is of greater relevance. This follows from 
the fact that in the context of international trade disputes-the pri-
mary arena of American-European regulatory conflict currently-it 
is permission to regulate, rather than an obligation to regulate, that 
is fundamentally at issue. Before both the WTO and the European 
courts, the EU has argued that it is permitted to regulate, relying on 
the precautionary principle to defend against claims of "excessive 
precaution." By contrast, as Veerle Heyvaret has documented, efforts 
to use the precautionary principle to challenge "insufficient precau-
tion" have been rare and, for the most part, unsuccessful. As she 
writes, "it is undeniable that, to date, the role of the precautionary 
principle as a legal tool to compel [European] Community institutions 
51. Wiener distinguishes among what he terms three ''versions" of the precaution-
ary principle: (1) "Uncertainty does not justify inaction," (2) "Uncertainty justifies 
action," and (3) "Uncertainty requires shifting the burden and standard of proof." 
Wiener, supra note 9, at 528-29. In explanation of the first version, Wiener writes: 
In its most basic form, the PP permits regulation in the absence of complete 
evidence about the particular risk scenario .... This version of the PP rebuts 
the contention (often urged by those about to be regulated) that uncertainty 
precludes regulation, but it does not answer the harder question: what action 
to take, given inevitable uncertainty. 
Id. at 9, at 528. 
52. Id. at 529-30. 
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to take protective action has been marginal."53 Joseph Corkin goes a 
step further in saying that "in practice the Court dismisses such in-
sufficient precaution challenges with little ceremony."54 
More broadly, as David Vogel himself has written elsewhere, the 
agenda behind the EU's push for the incorporation of the precaution-
ary principle in multiple international agreements in the first place 
was primarily defensive. Faced with the likelihood of American and 
other challenges to its regulations before the WTO, the EU set out to 
entrench the precautionary principle in international law so as to be 
able to rely on it in justification of scientifically controversial mea-
sures before the WT0.55 For their part, critics have accused 
European institutions of using the precautionary principle "at the in-
ternational level as a shield to justify measures that are viewed as 
thinly disguised forms of protectionism by the EU's trading part-
ners."56 The call for more stringent or risk-averse measures-the 
question at the heart of the precautionary principle's prescriptive in-
terpretation-was largely irrelevant to these transatlantic 
controversies. Instead, the key issue in dispute in recent European-
American regulatory disagreements has been the precautionary prin-
ciple's capacity to shield regulatory discretion from scientific 
oversight. 
Trade disputes surrounding the validity of European food safety 
regulation under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement 
provide the paradigmatic example. Created in 1994 and binding on 
all members of the WTO, the SPS Agreement specifies the conditions 
under which Members to the Agreement are entitled to deviate from 
international standards pertaining to variously defined food-related 
risks. 57 While acknowledging the autonomy of such Members in this 
regard, 58 the Agreement aims to ensure that "these sovereign rights 
are not misused for protectionist purposes and do not result in unnec-
essary barriers to international trade."59 Towards this goal, the SPS 
Agreement requires that where national measures exceed interna-
tional standards, they be "based on scientific principles and ... not 
53. Veerle Heyvaert, Facing the Consequences of the Precautionary Principle in 
European Community Law, 2006 EuR. L. REv. 185, 195. See also LEE, supra note 48, 
at 104--05 ("[T]he precautionary principle essentially expands the substantive discre-
tion of decision-makers. It is much less obviously amenable to being used as a sword, 
to constrain substantive discretion, in an action claiming that regulation is insuffi-
ciently precautionary."). 
54. Corlcin, supra note 48, at 380. 
55. David Vogel, Trade and the Environment in the Global Economy, in GREEN 
GIANTs?, supra note 1, at 231, 241. 
56. Majone, supra note 48, at 108. 
57. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 
14, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
58. ld. art. 2.1. 
59. ALEMANNO, supra note 48, at 239. 
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maintained without sufficient scientific evidence,"60 and also be 
"based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the 
risks to human, animal or plant life or health."61 The precautionary 
principle's status and its consequent influence on the scope and 
meaning of the required "scientific evidence" under the SPS Agree-
ment, have been the central bone of contention in contemporary 
transatlantic trade disputes. 
The controversy that surrounded the legality of the EU's ban on 
hormone-treated beef for over two decades perhaps best illustrates 
this point. Responding to concerns over cancer, the EU prohibited in 
1985 both the production and importation of the meat of animals 
treated with growth hormones, an action that was taken notwith-
standing a finding by a scientific working group that the hormones 
posed no risk to health.62 Mter the EU began to enforce the ban in 
1989, the United States and Canada challenged it before the WTO 
dispute-settlement bodies under the argument that it was not based 
on an adequate risk assessment.63 The EU defended its action with 
the claim that the precautionary principle, which it considers to be 
integral to the SPS/WTO regime under principles of international 
law, authorized its regulation notwithstanding any deficiencies in the 
risk assessment.64 In 1997, without ruling on the status of the pre-
cautionary principle in international law, the WTO Appellate Body 
held that the principle could not "override" the risk-assessment re-
quirements of the SPS Agreement.65 In the wake of this ruling, and 
the EU's refusal to rescind the ban, the United States and Canada 
received WTO authorization to impose high-import tariffs on some 
EU agricultural products as a retaliatory trade sanction. The long-
standing trade dispute was finally resolved in 2012 after the United 
States and Canada agreed to lift the sanctions in exchange for a sub-
stantial increase in the EU's import quotas for hormone-free beef. 
The EU's ban on hormone-fed beef will remain in effect.66 
60. SPS Agreement art. 2.2. 
61. Id. art. 5.1. 
62. Grace Skogstad, Regulating Food Safety Risks in the European Union: A Com-
parative Perspective, in WHAT's THE BEEF? THE CoNTESTED GoVERNANCE OF 
EUROPEAN Fooo SAFETY 213, 223 (Christopher Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006). 
63. ALEMANNO, supra note 48, at 90-91. 
64. The EU argued that the precautionary principle was "a general customary 
rule of international law or at least a general principle oflaw." Appellate Body Report, 
European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
'II 121, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
65. Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones 'II 125; see also ALEMANNO, supra note 
48, at 280-81. 
66. Gilbert Reilhac, Vote Ends EU-U.S. Hormone-Treated Beef Row, REUTERS, 
Mar. 14, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/eu-trade-beef-idUSL5E8EE 
50620120314; Ed Bray, Transatlantic Hormone Beef Trade War Ends, EUROPOLITICS, 
Apr. 26, 2012, http://www.europolitics.info/transatlantic-hormone-beef-trade-war-
ends-art332735-10.html. 
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As evident from the discussion above, within the context of re-
cent transatlantic trade disputes, the precautionary principle has 
essentially functioned as a demand for a deferential standard of judi-
cial review regarding science-based regulatory measures. The key 
disagreement in this respect pertains to the level of scrutiny to be 
accorded to a member state's scientific findings under the WTO's "sci-
entific justification discipline."67 The EU has found itself on the 
losing side of this issue in a number of food-safety-related cases in 
which the WTO insisted on conducting its own scientific assessment 
of the relevant risks.ss 
The European courts, by contrast, have shown significant defer-
ence towards Community health and safety measures.69 Most 
importantly, in this connection, the courts have upheld the Commu-
nity's authority to rely not only on "science-based factors," but also on 
a broad range of "societal, economic, traditional, ethical and environ-
mental factors" in reaching regulatory decisions. 70 In the words of 
Alberto Alemanno, "[t]he perceived need to consider non science-
based factors within the decision-making process characterizes the 
European approach to risk analysis and differentiates it greatly from 
the one adopted by the U.S. regulatory agencies and by the WTO/SPS 
framework."71 Notably, this discretion coexists in European case law 
with an American-modeled distinction between risk assessment and 
risk management steps in the regulatory process, as well as with a 
willingness to impose detailed procedural requirements in judicial 
evaluation of the risk-assessment process.72 With respect to risk 
management, meaning the decision on the regulatory measures to be 
taken in response to the risk, the European courts have upheld the 
existence of extra-scientific, precautionary, regulatory authority.73 
67. ALEMANNO, supra note 48, at 338. 
68. Alberto Alemanno describes the WTO's standard of review applicable to SPS 
measures as showing "a growing trend towards a narrowly-construed interpretation 
of the scientific requirements leading to an intrusive role ... in reviewing (food safety) 
science-based risk regulations adopted by WTO members." Id. at 345. 
69. I d. at 324-25 ("[I]n all these cases, the court, after having relentlessly recalled 
the limited scope of review applicable to science-based measures, has always re-
frained from addressing the merits of the scientific findings brought by the parties, 
thus showing great deference to the EC scientific bodies."). Notably, as Alemanno 
points out, the European courts have shown lesser deference toward Member States 
when the latter offered public health justifications for domestic measures that dero-
gated from harmonized EU legislation. Id. at 325-26. 
70. Alberto Alemanno, The Shaping of European Risk Regulation by Community 
Courts 43 (Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 18/2008, 2008), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1325770. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 7, 21, 26. 
73. ld. at 60. 
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The 1999 Pfizer decision serves as the paradigmatic example in this 
regard.74 
The case concerned a challenge to an EU regulation prohibiting 
the sale of non-therapeutic (growth-promoting) antibiotic additives to 
livestock feed. Prior to imposing this ban the European Commission 
had requested the opinion of the Scientific Committee for Animal Nu-
trition (SCAN) regarding the potential for antibiotic resistance in 
humans as a consequence of the use of the antibiotic in question in 
the animal feed. Though SCAN opined that the feed posed "no imme-
diate risk to human health," the Commission proceeded to withdraw 
authorization for this type of antibiotic use all the same. 75 Ruling on 
the challenge to this ban, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) 
noted that "a scientific risk assessment ... is an important procedu-
ral guarantee whose purpose is to ensure the scientific objectivity of 
the measures adopted,"76 but went on to uphold the Community's au-
thority to take action based on reasons other than scientifically 
assessed risk.77 "[I]n a situation in which the precautionary principle 
is applied, which by definition coincides with a situation in which 
there is scientific uncertainty," the CFI held, "a risk assessment can-
not be required to provide the Community institutions with 
conclusive scientific evidence of the reality of the risk and the seri-
ousness of the potential adverse effects were that risk to become a 
reality."78 Instead, "under the precautionary principle the Commu-
nity institutions are entitled, in the interests of human health to 
adopt, on the basis of as yet incomplete scientific knowledge, protec-
tive measures which may seriously harm legally protected positions, 
and they enjoy broad discretion in that regard."79 
As the above suggests, when the precautionary principle is con-
strued as a permissive principle, cross-national divisions over its 
status and application are reduced to a disagreement over the proper 
scope of discretion in the regulation of risk. Put differently, the con-
flict revolves around the choice between divergent conceptions of the 
scope of agency autonomy in the regulation ofhealth and safety risks, 
or alternative models of administrative law. Each of these models 
aligns, in turn, with divergent historical regulatory paradigms, re-
spectively associated with the civil law and common law traditions, 
as discussed below. 
74. Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II-3305, 'll'll 
168-69, 323 [hereinafter Pfizer]. 
75. Alemanno, supra note 70, at 39 
76. ld. at 27. 
77. ld. at 39. 
78. Pfizer, 2002 E.C.R. II-3305, 'II 142. 
79. ld. 'II 170. 
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III. FRoM NUISANCE TO "HARD LooK" AND FRoM PoLICE TO 
PERMISSIVE PRECAUTION 
The constitutionality of Continental-modeled approaches to sani-
tary reform, regulation of noxious trades, and other environmental 
threats was a matter of controversy in both Britain and the United 
States during the nineteenth century. The existence of broad admin-
istrative discretion on when and how to respond to uncertain risks 
was the defining element of the Continental approach. The subordi-
nation of such decisions to judicial oversight was the mark of the 
countervailing common law approach. In the context of the late nine-
teenth century police-power debates, the question was cast in 
reference to the existence of nuisance-based limits on the scope of the 
police power. 
More than a substantive limit on the subject matter of regula-
tion, nuisance served here as a synonym for a judicial model of 
administration. As Christopher Tiedeman, the author of the leading 
treatise on the topic, wrote in 1886, "[w]hat is a nuisance [is] a judi-
cial question."80 Writing in 1851, a British barrister by the name of 
Joshua Toulmin Smith explained what was thought to be at stake in 
the requirement that regulatory interventions be restricted to nui-
sance adjudication. In placing the burden of proof on "those who 
allege any particular thing or course of proceeding to be inconsistent 
with the health of any neighbourhood, or its welfare," Toulmin Smith 
argued, the common law ensured that public health interventions 
would proceed only out of "true regard for the Public welfare" rather 
than "specious disguise" aimed at "gain[ing] some interested object, 
or ... crude individual notions."81 In this, nuisance law was said to 
fundamentally differ from its antithesis, the "foreign centralized sys-
tem of Police."B2 
"Law" and "Police," Christopher Tomlins has argued in reference 
to late eighteenth-century Anglo-American political discourse, stood 
for "distinct paradigms" of social ordering. 83 "Law" in this context 
meant the common law, which in turn referred to a set of limited-
government principles, notably including judicial supremacy. "Po-
lice," by contrast, imbued the state with the authority to manage and 
advance the common welfare. Its roots traced to early modern Conti-
nental legal and political thought and the "Continental police 
80. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS oF PoLICE PoWER 
IN THE UNITED STATES 426 (1886). 
81. J. TOULMIN SMITH, LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND CENTRALIZATION: THE CHAR-
ACTERISTICS OF EACH; AND ITS PRACTICAL TENDENCIES, AS AFFECTING SOCIAL, MORAL, 
AND PoLITICAL WELFARE AND PRoGREss 116 (1851). 
82. ld. at 204. 
83. CHRISTOPHER ToMLINS, LAw, LABoR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 38 (1993). 
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science" to which it gave rise by the 1700s.84 Of greatest relevance in 
this respect were the public health codes and regulations that absolu-
tist German and other Continental regimes promulgated during the 
eighteenth century under the heading of "medical police."85 
Rooted in cameralist and mercantilist conceptions of the impor-
tance of robust populations to the security and prosperity of the state, 
medical police viewed the state as the guardian of the health, safety, 
and morality of the nation. As the renowned Prussian physician Jo-
hann Peter Frank explained in a treatise he published in 1779, "[t]he 
internal security of the state is the subject of general police science," 
and "[m]edical police, like all police science, is an art of defense."86 
With this rationale in place, Frank proceeded to outline a highly de-
tailed list of hygienic practices to be enforced by the state in domains 
ranging from sexuality and infant- and child-care, to food, housing, 
and recreation.87 Though the ambitious agenda Frank put forth had 
little realistic chance of actual implementation, it nonetheless offers 
important insight into the regulatory ideal behind the medical police 
model.88 Integral to this model was the assignment to the state of 
seemingly unrestricted discretion in deciding what public health 
meant in practice and what regulatory measures could be deployed in 
its defense. 
By the 1840s, the clashing paradigms were front and center in 
the tumults surrounding Edwin Chadwick's sanitary reforms in Brit-
ain under the 1848 Public Health Act.89 Coming in response to the 
sanitary crisis in Britain's rapidly industrializing cities, and modeled 
after existing French examples, the Act established local and na-
tional boards of health with modest sanitary enforcement powers. 
The legislation was enacted against the backdrop of ongoing medical 
disagreement over whether and how filth caused disease, and hence 
over the very existence of a health-based rationale for governmental 
intervention in this arena.90 Most controversially, it was said to vio-
late core common law constitutional principles through the 
substitution of local nuisance courts with centralized boards. Joshua 
Toulmin Smith, author of the 1851 tract quoted above, was a leading 
opponent of the Public Health Act, and it was in the context of that 
fight that he promoted the virtues of nuisance law. In Britain, the 
84. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDA· 
TIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 63 (2005). 
85. GEORGE RosEN, FRoM MEDICAL PoLICE TO SociAL MEDICINE: EssAYS oN THE 
HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE 93 (1974). 
86. JoHANN PETER FRANK, A SYSTEM OF CoMPLETE MEDICAL PoLICE: SELECTIONS 
FROM JoHANN PETER FRANK 12 (Ema Lesky ed., E. Vilim trans., Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1976). 
87. GEORGE RosEN, THE HISTORY oF PuBLIC HEALTH 137-41 (1993). 
88. See DoROTHY PoRTER, HEALTH, CIVILIZATION, AND THE STATE 105-06 (1999). 
89. This section draws on Morag-Levine, Alkali Act, supra note 15, at 13-27. 
90. Id. at 17. 
2014] THE HISTORY OF PRECAUTION 1115 
argument regarding the unconstitutionality of Continental police was 
a political one directed at Parliament and public opinion. 91 The sover-
eignty of Parliament precluded judicial invalidation of laws that 
deviated from common law constitutional principles. By contrast, in 
the United States, the argument evolved into a claim allowing courts 
to strike down-under the due process clause-state laws passed 
"under the pretence of prescribing a police regulation."92 Either way, 
the common law model, by requiring proof before judge and jury re-
garding the existence of harm justifying intervention, was said to 
protect against government intrusion on property and liberty on spe-
cious health and safety grounds. 
Current divisions over the (permissive) precautionary principle 
replicate and continue this historical debate. Consider the parallels 
between the beef-hormone dispute described above and the late nine-
teenth-century controversy surrounding the regulation of 
oleomargarine, a butter substitute made from beef fat and churned 
milk.93 In the oleomargarine situation, as was the case with hor-
mones, at issue was the sufficiency of the evidence regarding risk, 
and the suspicion that restrictions and bans on the product were at 
least in part due to protectionist motivations. The various state and 
Supreme Court judges who reviewed the constitutionality of the oleo-
margarine laws differed in their understandings of the judiciary's 
role in disputes of this type. 94 Well beyond oleomargarine, the conflict 
over judicial scrutiny of "legislative facts" played out over a long list 
of statutes pertaining to the preservation of fish and game,95 food 
safety, sanitary reforms,96 and, most viscerally, labor laws.97 
Lochner v. New York (1905)98 provides the paradigmatic example 
in this regard. Rejecting the State of New York's proffered health-
based justification for a ten-hour limit on daily working hours, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the law because in its judgment, there 
was "no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or ap-
propriate as a health law to safeguard the public health or the health 
of the individuals who are following the trade of a baker."99 The state 
was entitled to impose "reasonable conditions" on property, liberty, 
and by extension freedom of contract, under the Fourteenth Amend-
91. Id. at 126-27. 
92. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 87 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting). On late 
nineteenth-century divisions in American jurisprudence regarding the role of courts 
in the review of the scientific facts underpinning legislation, see Morag-Levine, Facts, 
Formalism, supra note 15. 
93. Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The 
Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 83, 101-02 (1989). 
94. Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, supra note 15, at 72-75. 
95. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). 
96. Hutton v. City of Camden, 39 N.J.L. 122, 129-31 (1876). 
97. Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, supra note 15, at 71-85. 
98. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
99. Id. at 58. 
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ment.100 But it was up to the Court to ensure that "health and safety" 
were the true rationale for regulation, rather than a "mere pre-
text."101 Scientific confidence regarding harm prevention was 
supposed to mark the dividing line between the two. 
United States v. Carotene Products Co. (1938)102 resolved the 
constitutional question in favor of the Progressives' demand for judi-
cial deference. In this decision the Court upheld a federal statute 
that, citing threat to health and the potential for fraud, banned the 
shipment of milk mixed with fat or oil in interstate commerce. The 
Court held that the constitutionality of "regulatory legislation affect-
ing ordinary commercial transactions" was, for all intents and 
purposes, to be presumed.103 Minimally rational legislative findings 
of risk to health would henceforth be entitled to deference as a matter 
of constitutional law. But the fight, soon thereafter, shifted to the ad-
ministrative arena. 
The construction of judicial review of administrative decisions as 
a fundamental common law constitutional requirement is most 
closely associated with A.V. Dicey. For Dicey, the subordination of 
agencies to regular courts, as opposed to administrative tribunals, 
was essential to the "rule of law." In this, he believed, the United 
States and Britain shared a common bond that set their legal sys-
tems apart from the European droit administratif As he wrote, "[i]n 
England and in countries which, like the United States, derive their 
civilization from English sources, the system of administrative law, 
and the very principles upon which it rests, are in truth unknown."104 
Roscoe Pound echoed Dicey in 1921, when, against the backdrop of 
unprecedented growth in federal and state administrative power dur-
ing World War I, he warned of"the tendency to commit everything to 
boards and commissions which proceed extrajudicially'' and to violate 
in the process "common law postulates."105 In his 1938 report as head 
of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administra-
tive Law, Pound explicitly called on the American legal profession to 
counter "administrative absolutism" by "safeguarding individual in-
terests and preserving the checks and balances involved in the 
common law doctrine of the supremacy of law."106 
The 1946 passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A) 
marked a temporary truce with seemingly no clear winner in the his-
toric conflict-a "formula upon which opposing social and political 
100. Id. at 53. 
101. !d. at 56. 
102. 304 u.s. 144 (1938). 
103. !d. at 152. 
104. A.V. DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE LAw OF THE CoN-
STITUTION 180 (1885). 
105. RoscoE PoUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CoMMON LAw 7 (1921). 
106. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 
331, 342 (1938). 
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forces have come to rest," as Justice Jackson famously put it. 107 But 
when it came to the key issue of judicial review of administrative ac-
tions, the scope of Pound and the American Bar Association's victory 
would become evident in time. Whereas in the initial decades follow-
ing the AP A's passage the federal courts were cautious and 
deferential when reviewing agency decisions, in the early 1970s the 
D.C. Circuit adopted what came to be known as the "hard-look" doc-
trine, which required "agencies to undertake a reasoned elaboration 
of their decisions and to submit the factual basis, methodology, and 
logic ofthose decisions to exacting judicial scrutiny."108 Science-based 
environmental regulations and health and safety regulations were 
singled out in this process for particular attention, as judges began to 
scrutinize the processes and evidence on which the agencies relied in 
the face of contested scientific questions. 109 During the 1970s, inten-
sive judicial review of science-based regulatory decisions co-existed, 
especially within the D.C. Circuit, with a precautionary willingness 
to uphold agency discretion "on the frontiers of scientific knowl-
edge."110 But the Supreme Court's 1980 "benzene decision" signaled a 
shift in this regard. 
That case, Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum 
Institute, 111 concerned a rule of the Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration (OSHA) that reduced the permitted level of exposure 
to benzene in the workplace from 10 ppm to 1 ppm. OSHA justified 
the 1-ppm standard on feasibility grounds, working from the assump-
tion that there was no safe exposure level to benzene. In basing the 
standard on feasibility, rather than risk assessment, the agency re-
lied on a specific provision within the Occupational Safety and 
Health (OSH) Act, Section 6(b), which concerned the regulation of 
toxic substances. The Supreme Court invalidated the 1-ppm standard 
due to the agency's failure to establish the existence of a "significant 
risk" requiring such a reduction. Absent such a preliminary finding of 
significant risk, OSHA could not impose further feasibility-based re-
strictions on exposure to benzene. This requirement, as the Court 
saw it, followed from the definition of a health and safety standard, 
under Section 3(8) of the OSH Act, as one that is "reasonably neces-
sary and appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment."112 All 
standards implemented under the Act, even those pertaining to toxic 
107. Wang Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950). 
108. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, WHAT PRocEss IS DUE? CoURTS AND SciENCE-POLICY Dis-
PUTES 116 (1987). 
109. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
AMERICA 73 (1995). 
110. Id. at 78 (quoting AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d. 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane). 
111. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 
u.s. 607 (1980). 
112. 29 u.s.c. § 652(8) (1970). 
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substances under Section 6(b), were subject to this a priori eviden-
tiary burden.113 As a matter of statutory interpretation, this was a 
conclusion with little basis in the text or history of the statute, as 
many observers have noted.114 Its roots, instead, harked back to fun-
damental common law principles conditioning the reasonableness of 
regulation on proof of injury before a court.115 
The analogy between the Court's reasoning in the Benzene Case 
and Lochner-era jurisprudence was first made in Justice Marshall's 
dissent in the case. 116 The key difference between the Court's invali-
dation of the ten-hour workday in Lochner and the 1-ppm standard in 
the Benzene Case was the capacity of Congress in the latter case to 
amend the statute and emphatically confer on the agency authority 
to forgo proof of the existence of risk in the implementation of feasi-
bility-based standards. But, as Martin Shapiro has written, the 
difference between substantive due process in constitutional review 
and in administrative law review under the hard-look doctrine was 
greater in theory than in practice. 117 "The ultimate administrative 
law question in judicial review of rulemaking," Shapiro wrote, 
is identical to the ultimate constitutional question in eco-
nomic substantive due process review-is the rule 
reasonable? In both instances what is or is not reasonable 
depends on a judicial assessment of the legitimacy and im-
portance of the government's purposes, the appropriateness 
of the means chosen to achieve those purposes, and the costs 
to other legitimate interests those means will generate.118 
113. "The Court's plurality decision did not represent a wholesale rejection of the 
precautionary approach to regulation," and allowed for other than quantitative risk 
assessment where quantitative analysis ''was not possible given the extent of uncer-
tainty." Percival, supra note 4, at 65. At the same time the case was taken as 
signaling that "some form of quantitative risk assessment was necessary as a prelude 
to deciding whether the risk was large enough to deserve regulation." NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH CoUNCIL, CoMMITTEE ON RisK AssESSMENT oF HAzARDous AIR PoLLUTANTS, 
SciENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK AssESSMENT 33 (1994). On the connection between 
the Benzene Case and the institutionalization of risk assement in American regula-
tion see also Elizabeth Fisher, Framing Risk Regulation: A Critical Reflection, 4 Eur. 
J. Risk Reg. 125, 127 (2013). 
114. See, e.g., CASs R SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING 
THE REGULATORY STATE 196 (1990). 
115. NoaA MoRAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR PoLLUTION IN THE 
CoMMON LAw STATE 36-37 (2003). 
116. In his dissent, Justice Marshall accused the plurality of distorting the statute 
to fit with its "own views of proper regulatory authority," and explicitly compared the 
decision to Lochner. Indus. Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 688, 723-24 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
117. Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court's 'Return' to Economic Regulation, in 1 
STUD. IN AM. PoL. DEv. 91, 92-93 (1986). 
118. Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447, 471-72 
(1986). 
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In the context of the mid-1980s, when Shapiro made this argu-
ment, his analogy between historical substantive due process and the 
''hard look" doctrines was decisively out of step with the prevailing 
view. Under the dominant assessment, the judiciary's newly adopted 
willingness to scrutinize agencies' health and safety regulations 
tended to be construed as a pro-regulatory "reformation"119divorced 
from any historical antecedents.120 
The administrative law doctrines that came into being during 
the 1960s and '70s no doubt differed froin their predecessors in a cru-
cial respect: the courts' willingness to scrutinize regulatory inaction, 
as well as action. 121 Whereas the threat of governmental overreach-
ing and a consequent infringement of market liberties and individual 
property rights had been the primary concern of administrative judi-
cial review in earlier eras, it was the dangers of insufficient health 
and safety regulation that initially inspired the hard-look doctrine. 
Nevertheless, in granting courts a final say on the reasonableness of 
both regulatory inaction and action, the doctrine built upon and re-
vived dormant common law principles of judicial supremacy. 
The existence of judicially imposed limits on administrative risk 
regulation is the common thread linking common law nuisance doc-
trines with hard-look judicial review. Conversely, the autonomy of 
administrative discretion from judicial oversight of this type ties the 
Continental police model to the permissive precautionary principle. 
IV. VARIATION ACROSS COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS: 
WHY IS BRITAIN DIFFERENT? 
Transnational differences over permissive precaution correspond 
to the well-established differential in the prevalence of litigation and 
judicial review of environmental risk regulation between American 
119. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1682-83 (1975); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-
Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 177, 178 ("These developments represent an effort, 
still somewhat tentative, to formulate an independent public law-a body of doctrine 
to control agency action (and inaction) that does not derive from traditional common-
law principles or statutory provisions or constitutional commands."). 
120. I d. at 187 ("The new developments are leading toward a public law that is to a 
substantial degree independent of private law principles. But because of the absence 
of a historical tradition, the effort to define the elements of such a public law remain 
tentative and ill-formed."). 
121. Stewart, supra note 119, at 1682-83; Sunstein, supra note 119, at 184: 
[T]he courts have allowed beneficiaries of regulatory statutes both to partici-
pate in agency activity and to initiate agency action. This is a revolutionary 
development, for the traditional role of the courts was to allow regulated en-
tities to avoid governmental intrusions. If inadequate regulatory protection 
was forthcoming, the remedy was to come from political pressures, not the 
courts. 
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administrative processes and those of Europe. 122 The thesis is per-
haps best associated today with Robert Kagan's work on American 
"adversarial legalism."123 With the notable exception of Mi:rjan 
Damaska's work,l24 however, research into the origins of European-
American differences in legal culture has tended to downplay the re-
spective roles of the common and civil law traditions as a potential 
root cause. Instead, the prominent line of explanation has looked to 
specific features of American political structure and constitutional 
history. In this vein, Kagan explains American adversarial legalism 
largely in reference to the collision between the fragmented structure 
of U.S. regulatory institutions (itself a product of a deep-seated cul-
ture of distrust in government) and exponential growth in citizen 
demand for regulatory interventions in the later decades of the twen-
tieth century. 125 A second school of thought, grounded in rational-
choice theory, attributes the greater importance of judicial review in 
U.S. administrative politics, relative to Europe, to the incentive 
structures associated with American separation of powers, in con-
trast to those present under European parliamentary systems.126 
The tendency to discount if not dismiss the role oflegal traditions 
in the creation of cross-national regulatory differences is perhaps 
best explained by the challenge that evident and relevant variations 
across common law jurisdictions pose in this respect. A cursory com-
parison of the history of environmental and health and safety 
regulatory practices is sufficient to reveal substantial differences 
122. BRICKMAN, JASANOFF & ILGEN, supra note 3, at 45-46 ("Even a casual observer 
is struck by the vastly lower level of judicial involvement in European regulatory 
processes."), 119 ("In defining the scope of judicial review, U.S. courts have shown less 
deference to the administrative agencies than have their European counterparts."). 
See also BADARACCO, JR., supra note 3, at 3, 40; RosE-ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 
12-16. 
123. As Robert Kagan has noted in this regard: 
[C]ompared to European democracies, regulatory decisionmaking in the 
United States entails many more legal formalities .... Agency decisions are 
frequently challenged in court by dissatisfied parties and reversed by judges, 
who dictate further changes in administrative policymaking routines .... 
Overall, the clash of adversarial argument has a larger influence on decisions 
than in other countries' regulatory systems, where policy decisions are char-
acterized by a combination of political and expert judgment and consultation 
with affected interests. 
KAGAN, supra note 3, at 12. 
124. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FAcEs OF JusTICE AND STATE AuTHORITY (1986). 
125. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 15. 
126. See, e.g, Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on "Administra· 
tive Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies": Administrative Process and 
Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REv. 499 
(1989); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry Weingast, Administrative Pro· 
cedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 243 (1987); Terry M. 
Moe & Michael Caldwell, The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A 
Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems, 150 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THE-
ORETICAL EcoN. 171 (1991); Michael F. Thies, Keeping Tabs on One's Partners: The 
Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments, 45 AM. J. PoL. Scr. 580 (2001). 
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among common law states, with respect to both the timing and mode 
of regulatory intervention and the administrative law doctrines at 
play. The contrast between British and American approaches to envi-
ronmental regulation, most importantly where the scope of 
administrative discretion is concerned, was, in fact, the subject of an 
earlier book by David Vogel, tellingly titled National Styles of Regula-
tion.127 Jonathan Wiener notably points to the existence of 
differences between a British and Continental approach to regulation 
in The Reality of Precaution, in order to refute the alleged dichotomy 
between American and European approaches: "[S]ignificant variation 
exists within the United States and within Europe: for example Cali-
fornia and Sweden often adopt highly precautionary policies ... and 
the United Kingdom often plays an intriguing intermediary role be-
tween the United States and continental Europe."128 On its face, the 
existence of these differences appears to refute the causal link be-
tween common law ideology and institutions and the creation of what 
stands as a distinctively American insistence on the adjudication of 
risk. 
Notwithstanding, differences between Britain and the United 
States, and, for that matter, other common law jurisdictions do not a 
priori negate the common law's influence in the American case if two 
key points are kept in mind. The first is the presence, in all common 
law systems, of Continental legal and administrative influences. The 
second is the recognition that different common law countries, for a 
variety of reasons, absorbed Continental, civil-law-based ideas , in 
differing degrees and at their own rates. 
The common law in England has long existed in tension with the 
efforts of a long line of English reformers, such as Bentham, who 
were deeply critical of the common law and molded their proposals on 
Continental models. 129 The competing pulls of Continental-inspired 
administrative reform, and common-law-based opposition, shaped 
the evolution of British regulatory institutions during the nineteenth 
century. The result was a hybrid British administrative tradition 
bearing the imprint of regulatory principles associated with both le-
gal traditions. 13° 
As the controversies surrounding codification and related admin-
istrative reforms attest, Continental regulatory institutions likewise 
shaped American nineteenth-century debates. For reasons including 
the existence of constitutional judicial review and a decentralized fed-
eralist structure, the common law proved more resilient in the United 
States than in Britain. Roscoe Pound commented on this phenome-
127. VoGEL, supra note 5. 
128. Wiener, supra note 7, at 6. 
129. Morag-Levine, Common Law, Civil Law, supra note 15, at 616-19. 
130. Noga Morag-Levine, Alkali Act, supra note 15, at 6. 
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non when he wrote: "[l]t is not an accident that common-law 
principles, as they were fashioned in the age of Coke, have attained 
their highest and most complete logical development in America, and 
that in this respect we are and long have been more thoroughly a 
common-law country than England herself."131 Where current ad-
ministrative safeguards against accidents and other hazards are 
concerned, William Forbath has noted the greater hold in the United 
States, relative to Britain, of"judicial processes and common law cat-
egories and baselines."132 Differences between Britain and the 
United States have consequently been mistakenly read so as to ex-
clude common-law-based explanations for distinctive aspects of 
American regulatory culture. This misunderstanding is central to the 
near absence of this line of analysis from comparative environmental 
politics, including the two books under discussion. 
v. THE REALITY AND POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: 
THE VIEW FROM HISTORY 
Vogel and Wiener's shared conclusion is that legal institutions 
and traditions are not relevant to European-American differences 
over the precautionary principle; as discussed earlier, they reach this 
point via quite different routes. For Wiener, this view follows from 
the absence of any discernible pattern distinguishing American and 
European regulation of risk; for Vogel, it is a function of the ostensi-
bly recent pedigree of the currently more precautionary European 
approach. Their understanding of the role of judicial review in the 
transatlantic comparative context similarly differs. In both cases, 
however, their treatment of this topic is significantly limited by the 
absence of a longer historical framework. 
Of the two books, it is Vogel's The Politics of Precaution that 
most directly engages with the significance of judicial review. Build-
ing on the comparative literature discussed earlier, Vogel, on more 
than one occasion, highlights the contribution of differences in judi-
cial review to current transatlantic divisions, as in the following 
passage: "Courts on both sides of the Atlantic have also played an 
important role. While in the United States, they have subjected risk 
regulations to greater scrutiny, European courts have often given EU 
policy makers considerable discretion to enact precautionary regula-
tion."133 Importantly, however, he does not relate this divergence to 
differences between the American and European legal systems or his-
torical antecedents of any type. Instead, he dates the split between 
the American and European models of judicial oversight to the 1980 
131. PoUND, supra note 105, at 42. 
132. WILLIAM FoRBATH, The Long Life of Liberal America: Law and State-Building 
in the U.S. and U.K., 24 LAw & HrsT. REv. 179, 183-84 (2006). 
133. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 253. 
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Benzene Case, which, as he writes, "placed the burden of proof on 
regulators to demonstrate that an environmental risk was suffi-
ciently important to justify regulating it."134 In this connection, Vogel 
highlights the contrast between the Benzene Case, and the "precau-
tionary logic"135 of a number of earlier decisions, most notably Ethyl 
Corporation v. EPA, 136 from which it departed. The contrast between 
the 1976 and 1980 decisions serves in this fashion as one piece in the 
explanation for the perceived shift in the stringency of American reg-
ulation between the 1970s and '80s. Whereas earlier, "many 
American policies reflected a willingness to impose regulations in the 
face of scientific uncertainty," increased judicial scrutiny in the 1980s 
contributed to the growing role of formal risk assessment in the 
American regulatory process since that time, on Vogel's account.137 
At issue in Ethyl were EPA regulations aimed at phasing out 
leaded gasoline, notwithstanding uncertainty as to the hazards asso-
ciated with airborne lead. Upholding the EPA's action, Judge Skelly 
Wright offered an explicitly precautionary rationale in favor of defer-
ence to the agency in the case: "[T]he statutes-and common sense-
demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is 
less than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable."13s The opinion 
became a centerpiece of an important, though ultimately short-lived, 
federal judicial effort to "construe a precautionary standard for envi-
ronmental protection."139 The Benzene Case departed from this 
trend, as Vogel correctly points out. But in doing so, it also built upon 
deeply rooted common law principles regarding the evidentiary bur-
dens necessary for regulatory findings of reasonable risk. 
If one takes the 1960s and '70s as the relevant baseline it is easy 
to lose sight of the common law's significance in shaping U.S. regula-
tory policy. After all, it was the perceived failure of common law 
environmental doctrines, primarily nuisance law, that prompted the 
creation of the new federal environmental regime during that 
time.140 The new environmental statutes, particularly where they re-
lied on technology standards allowing regulators to bypass scientific 
proof of risk in favor of feasibility, reflected disenchantment with the 
common law's evidentiary burdens. The Ethyl court's deference to the 
EPA's "precautionary"141 implementation of the Clean Air Act was 
consistent with this sensibility. It is significant, however, that the 
134. ld. at 256. 
135. ld. 
136. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane). 
137. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 35-36. 
138. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 25. 
139. JASANOFF, supra note 109, at 78. 
140. RICHARD J. LAzARus, THE MAKING oF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 133-34 (2004) 
("The premise of much modern environmental law has been that such common law 
doctrines, especially nuisance law, have failed to deal with environmental issues."). 
141. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 25. 
1124 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 62 
D.C. Circuit was sharply divided on this issue and that within four 
years the Supreme Court insisted on a change in course. Sheila Jasa-
noff attributes this shift to the agencies' diminished legitimacy in the 
wake of regulatory decisions based on inconclusive science.142 Impor-
tantly, the political vulnerability of American agencies in this regard 
distinguished them from their European counterparts. 143 Because 
American regulatory culture privileged scientific proof of harm as a 
test of regulatory legitimacy, U.S. agencies and courts soon retreated 
from their precautionary venture. The greater fit of this type of pre-
cautionary regulation with European regulatory culture made 
European regulators less politically vulnerable in this regard. 
The precautionary tilt in American environmental law around 
the 1970s was not in any sense limited to that period. At intervals 
throughout American history there have been efforts to introduce 
public health, labor, and other social reforms modeled on Continental 
paradigms of administrative discretion, as the previous section dis-
cussed. Many of these reform efforts took root. But their capacity to 
do so was often slowed, or hindered, by attacks on the constitutional-
ity or broader legitimacy of regulatory deviations from the common 
law's evidentiary burdens and principles of judicial supremacy, much 
like those that led the more precautionary American environmental 
regime of the 1970s to quickly shift course. 
Vogel considers the change in American policy between the 
1970s and '90s to be a decisive refutation of "[t]he claim that deeply 
rooted cultural or social attitudes . . . can adequately explain the 
large number of current differences in Europe and the United 
States," and attributes this category of argument to "myopic under-
standing of the historical pattern of protective regulation across the 
Atlantic."144 Yet Vogel's own timeline begins around the 1960s, offer-
ing little discussion of the transatlantic patterns existing before that 
time. The question is one regarding which there is a need for more 
systematic historical work, but anecdotal examples suggest that, in 
keeping with what Vogel views as the current transatlantic pattern, 
nineteenth-century American regulation of food safety,145 occupa-
142. JASANOFF, supra note 109, at 79. 
143. ld. at 73. 
144. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 34. 
145. General food regulation statutes existed in Britain, Germany, and Sweden by 
the end of the 1870s, and were adopted in most European nations during the subse-
quent two decades. OscAR E. ANDERSON, JR., THE HEALTH oF A NATION: HARVEY W. 
WILEY AND THE FIGHT FOR PuRE FooD 69-70 (1958). Though there were various mu-
nicipal and state efforts to enact food and drug regulation in the decades following the 
Civil War, id. at 70, "[t]he effort to pass a general [federal] anti-adulteration law was 
doomed to frustration," id. at 78. "Federal regulation of food and drugs in the United 
States began, in a broad, across-the-board way, with the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 
1906." JAMES HARVEY YoUNG, PuRE FooD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FooD AND DRuGs 
AcT OF 1906, at 3 (1989). The British Parliament's first comprehensive food safety law 
(the Adulteration of Food or Drink Act) was enacted in 1860. The United States did 
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tional health,l46 and pollution147 lagged behind the response of 
leading countries in Europe. The history of white phosphorous regu-
lation provides a particularly instructive example in this respect: by 
1912, when Congress enacted a statute that placed a prohibitive tax 
on white phosphorous matches in response to the known relationship 
between exposure to white phosphorous and the development of 
Phossy jaw disease among workers in match factories, a long list of 
European countries had already banned the manufacture and sale of 
phosphorous matches outright.t4s 
American Progressive reformers during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries made great efforts, at times successfully, to 
introduce European-modeled social and public health legislation into 
the United States.149 But it was precisely over these precautionary 
measures that the battle related to nuisance-based limits on the po-
lice power raged. The conflicts surrounding American environmental 
regulation during the 1970s represented another such moment. Vogel 
attributes the subsequent shift in American regulatory policy begin-
ning in the 1980s to a political "backlash" prompted by perceived 
"false positive policy errors,"150 as well as Republican control of Con-
gress.151 But these explanations are each consistent with the legal-
culture-based argument above in that they speak to the political ob-
stacles associated with precautionary regulation in the United States 
since the early nineteenth century. 
The two decades during which the United States outpaced Euro-
pean environmental regulation stand as a time of extraordinary 
attention to environmental risks, following a decades-long delay.152 
not enact an anti-adulteration law until the 1906 Food and Drugs Act, which was 
largely ineffective. JAMES C. WHORTON, THE ARsENIC CENTURY: How VICTORIAN BRIT· 
AIN WAS POISONED AT HOME, WoRK, AND PLAY 166 (2010). 
146. See DANIEL RoDGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SociAL PoLITics IN A PROGRESSIVE 
AGE 235-36 (1998): 
With the rapid elaboration of labor-protective statutes in Europe in the 
1890s, however, the American states had not kept pace. On this point those 
who knew both sides of the North Atlantic economy were of a common mind. 
France had adopted mejor new pieces of factory legislation in 1892 and 1900, 
Germany in 1891 ... and Britain in 1901. In comparison, Arthur Sadwell in 
1903 thought the Americans barely had an effective factory legislation sys-
tem at all. John Graham Brooks echoed this judgment the same year: "In no 
country of the first rank is this legislation so weak as in the United States." 
147. MoRAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND, supra note 115, at 56-62. 
148. These included Finland (1872), Denmark (1874), France (1897), Switzerland 
(1898), and Great Britain (1908). The Berne Convention of 1906 (which the United 
States failed to support) prohibited the use, import, and sale of white phosphorous 
matches. See Killing Men to Cheapen Matches, 41 LITERARY DIG. 88 (1910). 
149. RoDGERS, supra note 146, at 70. 
150. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 252. 
151. Id. at 258. 
152. As Vogel writes in connection to this, 
[h]istorically, American states have typically been regulatory laggards, 
rarely strengthening their health, safety, or environmental standards in the 
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The newly formed EU, by contrast, was then taking its first steps 
towards becoming an environmental regulatory power. The growth in 
European environmental regulation since the 1990s relative to the 
prior two decades is perhaps easiest to explain in reference to the 
change in European governance structures and regulatory capacity 
under the 1986 Single European Act, in particular the shift from an 
earlier requirement that the Council of Ministers unanimously vote 
on most environmental regulations to a "qualified majority" rule. As 
Vogel himself points out, "[a] s a result of this change in voting rules, 
between 1989 and 1991 the EU enacted more environmental laws 
than it had during the previous twenty years."153 If limited regula-
tory capacity earlier impeded the passage of European environmental 
regulation, what best explains the EU's ambitious regulatory agenda 
with this capacity in place? Specifically, what weight should we ac-
cord to short-term incidents, such as the false negative regulatory 
failures that Vogel highlights,154 relative to long-term legal-cultural 
factors? This question once again requires a longer historical frame-
work, focused on the individual European countries that would in 
time come to shape the EU's approach to environmental risk regula-
tion, with Germany and Sweden deserving particular attention. 
Vogel discusses Sweden, whose chemical regulations outstripped 
the United States already by the 1970s, as "an important exception to 
the relative stringency of European and American chemical regula-
tions prior to 1990, one which would subsequently have an important 
impact on the EU." He attributes Sweden's exceptionality to the exis-
tence of "substantial domestic political support for protecting human 
health and environmental quality," as well as to the country's "rela-
tively small chemical industry."155 Importantly, however, the origins 
of Swedish chemical policy significantly predate 1962,156 the year Vo-
gel identifies as being when "Sweden had begun to place the 
responsibility for classifYing poisonous and dangerous substances on 
producers."157 In fact, a 1906 Swedish Ordinance on Toxic Sub-
stances categorized chemicals in reference to their potential toxicity 
and, among other restrictions, prohibited the sale of toys containing 
mercury, lead, nickel, or cadmium. 158 This law built on a long list of 
absence of federal requirements that they do so. This explains why, during 
the 1960s and 1970s, the environmental and consumer movements placed a 
high priority on shifting the locus of regulatory policy making from the states 
to Washington. 
ld. at 287. 
153. Id. at 238. 
154. Id. at 252. 
155. Id. at 156. 
156. Mikael Karlsson, The Precautionary Principle, Swedish Chemicals Policy and 
Sustainable Development, 9 J. RrsK REs. 337, 344 (2006). 
157. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 156. 
158. Karlsson, supra note 156, at 345. 
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earlier precautionary legislation, including a 1787 prohibition on the 
sale of arsenic and seventeenth-century restrictions on the sale of 
hazardous substances by pharmacies.159 
In similar fashion, the German Vorsorgeprinzip, generally con-
sidered the progenitor of the European precautionary principle, lGo 
was also historically rooted. When it made its appearance in German 
air pollution policy during the 1970s, the Vorsorgeprinzip prescribed 
feasible incremental pollution reductions, by all sources, even in the 
absence of conclusive evidence regarding the specific emission's 
health or environmental impact.161 In other words, it served as a call 
for the implementation of a technology-based approach to pollution 
control, the origins of which dated to licensing requirements encoded 
in an 1810 Napoleonic decree on noxious trades and, prior to that, the 
mercantilist practices of absolutist French monarchs.162 Technology 
standards are precautionary in that they confer discretion to regulate 
without requiring proof of harm, and as such, they fundamentally de-
viate from common law nuisance principles. As I've argued 
elsewhere, this fact was relevant to early-1980s British opposition to 
the German-led effort to turn the Vorsorgeprinzip into a comerstone 
of European environmental policy. 163 Germany's ultimate success in 
this regard was likely aided by the false negative policy failures and 
other political factors Vogel highlights. 164 But the victory was also in 
no small measure a product of the fit between the principle and the 
civil-law-based sensibilities of leading EU member states, other than 
Britain. 
Vogel's rejection of cultural or institutional explanations for cur-
rent divisions between American and European approaches to 
precaution primarily follows from the difficulty of reconciling the pre-
sumed permanence of the relevant cultures and institutions, with the 
twenty or so years in which Europe, contrary to the expected pattem, 
arguably lagged behind American environmental risk regulation. 
This period aside, much of the evidence Vogel presents-most impor-
tantly in reference to differences in judicial review-is in quite 
consistent with cultural-institutional arguments of the type he re-
jects. Vogel's evidence in fact provides ample basis for the assertion of 
cultural-historical roots of the precautionary principle in its permis-
sive incarnation. 
The same cannot be said of Wiener's The Reality of Precaution, 
since its central thesis argues against greater European precaution, 
159. ld. at 344. 
160. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 266. 
161. ALBERT WEALE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: AN EVER 
CLOSER EcoLOGICAL UNION? 67 (2000). 
162. Morag-Levine, Alkali Act, supra note 15, at 9. 
163. Id. at 2. 
164. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 252. 
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either now or in the past. The two books' divergence on this point is in 
part due to differences in the universe of risks considered in each 
case: as discussed in Part I, Vogel focuses exclusively on environmen-
tal and health and safety risks, Wiener on a significantly broader 
category of risks including, most importantly, national security and 
crime. 
The logic behind Wiener's methodological move in this connec-
tion is clear. If the question is whether either Europe or the United 
States can be shown to be more proactive and stringent in their re-
sponse to risk, the source of the risk is ultimately immaterial. But 
Wiener's book makes an additional claim: not merely the absence of 
consistent transatlantic differences in risk regulation, but the essen-
tial irrelevance of legal-institutional tradition in that regard. 165 Yet, 
support for such a claim cannot be based on a lumping together of 
risks that the legal tradition has long treated differently; rather, it 
requires a sifting of the risks according to the legal tradition's own 
internal scheme. For this reason, if one is interested in the role of 
historical institutions-and legal traditions specifically-in recent 
transatlantic regulatory divisions, it is essential to narrow the analy-
sis, as Vogel does, to risks "that involve health, safety, and 
environmental risks caused by business."166 This follows from the na-
ture of the regulatory controversies at the heart of the historical 
common law paradigm. Most important in this connection is the long-
standing distinction, under common law, between matters within the 
monarch's essentially unlimited prerogative power, and those falling 
outside this prerogative and therefore subject to the control of parlia-
ment and the courts. 167 The authority to declare war and deploy 
armies overseas exemplified such prerogative powers.168 By defini-
tion, they were excluded from the category of governmental decisions 
that common law principles subordinated to judicial oversight. The 
evidentiary burdens associated with the nuisance paradigm in in 
19th century Britain and the US were limited to traditional local-
government concerns regarding health, morality, and public wel-
fare.169 The authority of the central state to protect against external 
threats was not similarly subject to question. For this reason, if one 
approaches the transatlantic comparison from a legal-historical per-
165. See Wiener, supra note 7, at 12, 26, 537. 
166. VoGEL, supra note 5, at 18. 
167. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *243-44. 
168. Blackstone offered the following on the King's prerogative at time of war: 
[T]he king has also the sole prerogative of making war and peace. For it is 
held by all the writers on the law of nature and nations, that the right of 
making war, which by nature subsisted in every individual, is given up by all 
private persons that enter into society, and is vested in the sovereign power. 
ld. at *249. 
169. See Part III, supra. 
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spective, the finding of greater American proactiveness regarding 
terrorism and WMD (or any other risk not requiring regulatory re-
strictions on property and market relations) is neither surprising nor 
relevant to an assessment of the influence of the common law 
paradigm. 
The books' treatment of the role of judicial review similarly dif-
fers. For Vogel, as discussed above, the European courts' increased 
deference towards EU regulatory institutions serves as part of the 
explanation for the currently greater European stringency. By con-
trast, The Reality of Precaution leaves out any discussion of the 
existence of consistent differences in this regard. This is perhaps 
most evident in the chapter titled "Legal and Administrative Sys-
tems,"170 which, rather surprisingly, concludes that the existence of 
discretion to regulate in the face of uncertainty ''was resolved in the 
United States 25 years earlier than in the EU."171 The authors offer 
in support the D.C. Circuit's earlier mentioned 1976 opinion in Ethyl 
Corporation v. EPA,172 but make no mention of the Supreme Court's 
formative 1980 decision in the Benzene Case. Neither does the chap-
ter discuss the European courts' interpretation of the precautionary 
principle in decisions such as the previously mentioned Pfizer case.173 
In the conclusion to the book, Wiener approvingly quotes the chapter 
just mentioned in connection with the purported incapacity of differ-
ences in administrative law, judicial review of agency action, and civil 
liability to "predict the observed complex variety of risk policies."174 
The Benzene Case is mentioned once, in the introduction to the book, 
with a brief concession to the effect that "[t]he march of precaution 
was arguably slowed by the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in [that 
case] ."175 But this is quickly followed with counter-examples indica-
tive of the existence of precautionary (meaning stringent) regulation 
in American law .176 
Wiener similarly offers the conclusions of the same chapter as 
indicative of the irrelevance of differences between legal systems to 
variation in levels of precaution, an argument he appears for the 
most part to equate with the "legal origins theory."177 Based in law 
and economics, that body of work has made far-reaching claims re-
garding the association between legal traditions and a range of 
170. Lucas Bergkamp & Turner T. Smith, Jr., Legal and Administrative Systems: 
Implications for Precautionary Regulation, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION, supra 
note 6, at 434. 
171. Id. at 444. 
172. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane). 
173. Pfizer Animal Health v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II-3305. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 74-79. 
174. Wiener, supra note 9, at 537. 
175. Wiener, supra note 7, at 10. 
176. ld. 
177. Wiener, supra note 9, at 537. 
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economic and political outcomes (government ownership of banks, 
regulation oflabor markets, and frequency of military conscription, to 
cite a few).l78 The general finding is that common law countries eco-
nomically outperform their civil law counterparts.179 This is said to 
follow from a higher incidence of economic intervention and govern-
ment ownership in civil law countries, a characteristic that is, in 
turn, said to correlate with negative impact on markets, increased 
corruption, and higher unemployment. 180 The theory's controversial 
normative message is clear and explicit: the common law promotes 
economic growth, the civil law impedes it. 181 This type of claim ap-
pears to be what Wiener most had in mind in writing that 
"explanations based on the 'legal system' are too coarse to account for 
the observed complex variation in particular precautions."182 
The controversy surrounding the legal origins theory is outside 
the scope of this essay.183 For present purposes it is sufficient to point 
out that the argument made here regarding the role of legal tradi-
tions is different in kind. The legal origins thesis links the common 
law with more business-friendly economic and regulatory outcomes, 
and thus speaks, at best, to the stringency of regulation or the pre-
scriptive dimension of precaution. My argument focuses on 
transatlantic differences in permissive precaution and, within that 
context, the impact of the respective common law and civil law ad-
ministrative paradigms. The correlation between this type of 
"permissive" discretion and regulatory stringency is a question in 
need of more systematic historical inquiry. In any case, for the pur-
pose of getting to the heart of transatlantic divisions over precaution, 
it is the principle's permissive, rather than prescriptive, dimension 
that is of primary concern. 
CoNCLUSION 
The argument regarding the greater resilience of common law 
principles in the United States is in no way intended to suggest an 
American consensus around the administrative models associated 
with these principles, or the containment of the American legal sys-
tem within an impervious boundary capable of deflecting all external 
influences. Quite to the contrary, American constitutional history, 
like that of Britain before it, is one of tug and pull between efforts to 
178. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. 
EcoN. LITERATURE 285, 286 (2008). 
179. Id. at 302. 
180. Id. 
181. Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing 
Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. CoMP. 
L. 765, 771 (2009). 
182. Wiener, supra note 9, at 537. 
183. Simon Deakin & Katharina Pistor, Introduction, in LEGAL ORIGIN THEORY ix 
(Simon Deakin & Katharina Pistor eds., 2013). 
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introduce Continental-inspired legislative and administrative re-
forms, on the one hand, and, on the other, countervailing reliance on 
common law principles by those seeking to block these influences. 
This was the case in the context of British sanitary reforms at the 
start of the nineteenth century; Lochner-era divisions over the police 
power; conflicts between the American Bar Association and the New 
Deal in the years leading up to the APA; and the disagreement be-
tween the Supreme Court and OSHA in the Benzene Case over the 
agency's implementation of a precautionary, generic approach to reg-
ulation of workplace carcinogens.184 In these examples and others 
like them, common law ideology served an oppositional function 
aimed at deflecting the introduction of European social and regula-
tory institutions. Despite this resistance, many transplanted 
Continental approaches did succeed in taking root. But the require-
ment that any such reforms be defended against widely repeated, and 
deeply resonant, challenges to their legitimacy shaped not only the 
terms of the debate, but at times their outcomes as well. 
The claim that common law principles of judicial supremacy re-
main a forceful influence within American regulatory policy is 
conceptually distinct from any assessment of the desirability of this 
influence. Neither does it suggest the inevitability of transatlantic 
conflict in this respect. Jonathan Wiener aptly highlights the preva-
lence and significance of "hybridization"185 between European and 
American regulatory institutions as a consequence of"substantial ex-
change or borrowing of ideas across the Atlantic."186 The 
phenomenon is not a novel one in any sense. For centuries, the his-
tory of public health and environmental regulation has evolved 
through processes of intra-European and transatlantic learning and 
adaptation, and we can expect that in the future, this process will 
only accelerate. But this history likewise attests to the tenacity and 
salience of the respective common law and civil law administrative 
paradigms. 
184. See supra Part III. 
185. Wiener, supra note 9, at 521. 
186. Id. 
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